9.( WN 1960

MEMBRANDUM FOR: General N. F. Twining

Chairman. Not Evaluation Subcommittee

SUBJECT:

1961 Net Evaluation

1. I have reviewed the Basic Assumptions for the 1961 Not Evaluation as set forth in your memorandum of 17 May. I agree upon the desirability of studying a general nuclear wer initiated by the USSE in a period of heightened world tengion.

- 2. The Basic Assumptions note that the US will receive only that tactical warning provided by warning devices. I presume that the Staff considers the condition of "beightened world tension" to constitute some type of strategic warning. It appears to me that it would be helpful in setting up the problem to define more precisely the extent of strategic warming and the nature of the US reaction to it. For example, in a situation of heightened tension, there may or may not bedepending upon the cause of the tension-advance preparations on the Seviet side. Obviously, the degree of preparation on the Soviet side and the amount of time available for such steps as peaking missiles would affect the weight and effectiveness of any Soviet attack. Similarly, the assumed extent of US preparations in a period of tension would affect both the damage to the US and the weight of the retaliatory attack It might be desirable, therefore, to spell out the promise degree of US alert.
- 3. I am concerned that these important assumptions be as realistic as possible, though all of us recognise, I am sure, that we cannot postulate correctly all the conditions under which an attack might occur. The problems I have noted in paragraph two are problems which I presume the

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Staff will reselve in the course of its deliberations. However, the manner in which they are received will greatly affect the outcome of the analysis. In these circumstances, it might be desirable for the Subcommittee to examine the more detailed assumptions which the Staff will proper as the study gets under way.

SIGNED

ALLEN W. DULLES Director

ONE :8 June 60

#13-2 - Addressee

#3- DDCI

#4- Signer's File ER via reading

#5- DDI

#6- AD/NE

#7- W/basic (TS 172655)

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